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ABSTRACT
Recently, many authors have argued that claims about determinism
and free will are situated on different levels of description and that
determinism on one level does not rule out free will on another.
This paper focuses on Christian List’s version of this basic idea. It
will be argued for the negative thesis that List’s account does not
rule out the most plausible version of incompatibilism about free
will and determinism and, more constructively, that a level-based
approach to free will has better chances to meet skeptical
challenges if it is guided by reasoning at the moral level – a level
that has not been seriously considered so far by proponents of this
approach.
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A classical compatibilist account of free will says, roughly, that physical determinism and
free will are situated on different levels and that determinism on one level does not threa-
ten free will on another (see, esp., Kenny [1978] 2012, chap. 2; Dennett 2004; see also
Melden 1961). For a while, this approach has been largely out of sight from the point of
view of mainstream debates about free will.1 Recently, however, it has made an impressive
comeback (see, e.g. Berofsky 2012; Roskies 2012; Ismael 2013; 2016; List 2014, 2019).
The aim of this paper is to critically discuss a recent and especially interesting level-
based approach developed by Christian List that he calls compatibilist libertarianism
(2019, 9), which I will present in section 2. In particular, I will argue for two theses. First,
List’s account does not rule out the most plausible version of incompatibilism about
free will and determinism (sections 3 and 4). Second, more generally and constructively,
a level-based approach to free will has better chances to meet incompatibilist and skep-
tical challenges if it is guided by reasoning at the moral level – a level that has not been
seriously considered so far by proponents of this approach (section 5).
Let me begin with some clarifications. First, I will assume that free will requires alterna-
tive action possibilities and I will not say anything about Frankfurt cases. Second, I assume
that physical determinism is the claim that given
the complete physical state of the world at any point in time, only one future sequence of
events is physically possible. ‘Physically possible,’ in turn, means ‘compatible with the funda-
mental physical laws’ (List 2019, 87).
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Finally, I stipulate that ‘compatibilism’ refers to the view that humans can have free will
even if physical determinism is true. ‘Incompatibilism’ refers to the denial of
compatibilism.
2. List’s compatibilist libertarianism
Intuitively, it seems very plausible that we choose among different options in our daily
lives – coffee over tea, to stay single rather than to marry, to become a philosopher
rather than a lawyer – and that free will involves the ability to make these choices. Accept-
ing this picture confronts us with a classical argument to the conclusion that no human
has free will if the world is deterministic:
(1) Free will requires that, at least in relevant situations, agents have alternative possibi-
lities and can do otherwise.
(2) Determinism implies that, in any situation, there are no alternative possibilities and
nobody can do otherwise.
(C) Free will and determinism are incompatible.
Many compatibilists have tried to argue that (2) is false by offering interpretations of
alternative possibilities or ‘can do otherwise’ that have room in a deterministic world. Dis-
positionalist accounts, for example, say, very roughly, that ‘can do otherwise’ should be
understood as the agent’s having a set of dispositions to act otherwise in relevant circum-
stances. Take someone’s ability to speak Spanish. When she is asleep she does not speak
Spanish, but she has the disposition to speak Spanish in relevant circumstances. Thus, she
can do otherwise than she, in fact, does. Determinism surely does not rule out these kinds
of abilities to do otherwise.
Many have doubts that this is a convincing reply to the incompatibilist challenge (see,
esp., Clarke 2009). List imagines a pianist who is disposed to play a Mozart sonata
flawlessly in normal circumstances, but who freezes ‘under the special pressure of an audi-
tion’ (List 2019, 85). According to dispositionalism, the pianist can play the sonata
flawlessly in the relevant sense, even if she does not. But List objects that this is ‘only a
watered-down notion of alternative possibilities: a notion that does not capture what
we normally mean by saying that someone ‘could have done otherwise’’ (List 2019, 85).
This very brief discussion of dispositionalism is relevant for figuring out how to evalu-
ate List’s own account. What he is looking for is an understanding of ‘can do otherwise’
that is compatible with physical determinism and not ‘watered-down’. I propose to under-
stand this in the following way: his interpretation of ‘can do otherwise’ should be close to
what we have in mind in everyday thinking about alternative possibilities and clearly rel-
evant for discussing free will in philosophical discourse. In the remainder of this section, I
will present his account. Then, I will discuss whether he achieves these aims.
The basic idea of List’s level-based reply to the incompatibilist argument is that it rests
on the mistake of not distinguishing between two different levels of description (for more
details, see List 2018, 2019, 89–90). Very generally, the view says that understanding
different phenomena requires describing them on appropriately fine- or coarse-grained
levels by using the corresponding concepts. Understanding the basic laws of nature,
for example, requires describing them at the fundamental physical level by using
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concepts like particles, forces, and so on. The evolution of species or the development of
the employment rate, however, require very different concepts and higher, more coarse-
grained levels of descriptions. We will not be able to understand the evolution of species
by describing the behavior of individual particles. We need notions like heredity, geno-
type, and others that ‘abstract away from the microphysical details’ (List 2018, 1).
Whether an agent can do otherwise must, according to this view, be described at the
psychological or agency level, using concepts like belief, desire, or intention. Actions
cannot be fully and informatively made sense of by using only physical concepts like
forces and particles.
Based on the idea that physical determinism is a claim at the physical level and that
claims about alternative action possibilities are situated on the psychological or agency
level, List reformulates the premises of the incompatibilist argument (see List 2019, 87):
(1) Free will requires that, at least in relevant situations, more than one course of action
be possible for the agent.
(2) Physical determinism implies that, given the complete physical state of the world at
any point in time, only one future sequence of events is physically possible.
Crucially, it does not follow that physical determinism and free will are incompatible.
The claim that only one course of events is physically possible is a claim at the physical
level of description and silent with regard to whether or not an agent has the possibility
to act otherwise, which is a claim at the psychological level. What would rule out alterna-
tive action possibilities is physical determinism in combination with what List calls the
linking thesis: ‘If, given the complete physical state of the world at any point in time,
only one future sequence of events is physically possible, then, in any situation, only
one course of action is ever possible for an agent’ (List 2019, 88 italics in original).
List then argues that the linking thesis is false. He does so by giving an account of how
the physical and psychological levels relate to each other. According to him, the psycho-
logical supervenes on and can be multiply realized by the physical.2 That is, if there is a
change at the psychological level, then there must be a change at the subvenient physical
level, and different patterns at the physical level, such as different arrangements of par-
ticles, can realize one and the same psychological-level state (see List 2019, 162, n. 8).
For example, my desire to drink water supervenes on the physical in the sense that if
the desire gets stronger this must correspond to a change on the physical level. The
desire is multiply realizable in the sense that different arrangements of particles and
forces can realize the very same desire.
List argues that this account of how the physical and the psychological relate to each
other opens the door for different action possibilities even if physical determinism is true.
Take Figure 1, a simplified version of List’s own illustration (2019, 94). The whole figure
represents an agent and the agent’s environment, say, me in my office. Rows stand for
the time periods t1 to t3, rectangles for possible psychological states, dots for possible
physical states and lines for possible histories, that is, roughly, how my environment
and I could develop from time t1 to t3. Take the rectangle at t1 to stand for my desire
to drink water. This desire is multiply realizable in the sense that it can be realized by
two different physical states (two dots in one rectangle). Now focus on the physical
level, that is, the dots. There is no branching in the histories. If my environment and I
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are in a certain physical state, only one future sequence of states is physically possible.
That is, at the physical level, the history from t1 to t3 is deterministic.
Now consider Figure 2 which, like Figure 1, represents me and my environment but,
unlike Figure 1, only focuses on the psychological level (the rectangles). There is branch-
ing in the histories. My desire to drink water at t1 can be followed by the psychological
states on the left side, say, my intention at t3 to get up and get a glass of water, and it
can be followed by the psychological states on the right side, say, my intention at t3 to
not get up, finish the paragraph, and get a glass of water afterwards. Thus, my being in
one psychological state at t1 is consistent with being in two different psychological
states at t2 and t3. That is, at the psychological level, my history is indeterministic.
This illustrates how, even if physical determinism is true, different future psychological
states are possible for the agent. As it is very plausible that these different psychological
states, including different intentions, desires, and so on, lead to different actions, it follows
that different future actions are possible for the agent. That is, at t1, it is possible for me to
get up at t3 and not to get up at t3. List concludes that ‘determinism at the physical level
can coexist with indeterminism at the level of agency’ (List 2019, 95). Therefore, the
linking thesis is false, the incompatibilist argument is refuted, and alternative action pos-
sibilities are compatible with physical determinism.
In the following two sections, I will discuss this line of reasoning and argue that List
does not fully meet his goals to offer a compatibilist interpretation of ‘can do otherwise’
that is close to everyday thinking (Section 3) and clearly relevant for free will (Section 4).3
In order to do so, I will put aside many issues that some may find worthy of discussion. For
example, I will not scrutinize List’s notions of multiple realizability and supervenience and
whether they deliver a non-reductive account of the mental. Similarly, I will put aside the
question of how multiply realizable mental states can be causally efficacious, as List
claims.4 I will also accept some key elements of List’s level-based approach, namely
that, first, different phenomena need to be described at different levels of description;
second, determinism, as it is typically understood, is a claim on the physical level; and
third, the claim that agents can do otherwise is a claim on the psychological level. Grant-




3. Can and can’t do otherwise
In this section I will argue that there is reason to doubt that List’s compatibilist interpret-
ation of ‘can do otherwise’ is the one at issue in everyday thinking. My starting point is the
question of whether the truth of physical determinism has implications for the psycho-
logical level. The linking thesis says: Yes, physical determinism leads to psychological
determinism. List replies: As the psychological supervenes on and is multiply realizable
by the physical, there can be physical determinism and psychological indeterminism. In
what follows, I will first present an everyday sense of ‘can do otherwise’ that would be
ruled out by physical determinism. Then I will defend this line of reasoning against poss-
ible objections.
Imagine Afia who, at t1, wants to drink water. Imagine also that Figures 1 and 2
correctly depict her and her environment and possible histories from t1 to t3. Thus,
we know the psychological states she can be in (rectangles) and we know the physical
states that can realize these psychological states (dots). So far, this is not new. But let
us imagine that we know one more thing. After t3 we learn that Afia in fact intended
to get up at t3 and did. As we know that there was only one trajectory from her phys-
ical and psychological states at t1 to her intention to get up at t3, we can infer which
physical state realized her desire to drink at t1.5 In short, after t3 we know that
Figures 3 and 4 were true of Afia, where the thicker lines and larger larger dots rep-
resent the actual history and the thinner lines and smaller dots reprsent the possible
but not-actual history.
According to List’s account, different courses of actions were possible for Afia at t1. Her
desire to drink could have been realized by the physical states represented by the large
and small dots which were, therefore, consistent with her desire. If Afia’s desire at t1
would have been realized by the state represented by the small dot, she would have devel-
oped other psychological states and would have acted differently. However, in fact, her
psychological state was realized by the physical state represented by the large dot,
which yielded the sequence which realized her getting up at t3.
Now let us ask: Could Afia at t1 choose between getting up and not getting up at t3? It
seems natural to reply along the following lines: ‘Contrary to what Afia believed, there was
nothing she could have done in order to not get up at t3’ or ‘She did not believe this, but,
in fact, there was, at t1, only one course of action possible for Afia’. Indeed, these claims
seem to be true. Other courses of action were consistent with her desire to drink at t1, but
there is a sense in which she could not have performed them. Now someone may ask why
we believe this: what explains that, at t1, only one course of action was possible for Afia?
The most natural answer is that the fact that her history from t1 to t3 was determined at
the physical level explains that she could not have done otherwise.
Figure 3.
PHILOSOPHICAL EXPLORATIONS 5
The case of Afia highlights a common idea that was covered before, namely that each
psychological state is in fact realized by a specific physical state even if it can be realized
by several different ones. Assuming that the realizing physical state is part of a determi-
nistic history, it is very plausible that the realized psychological states follow this determi-
nistic history. Thus, the case of Afia is meant to support the claim that physical
determinism leads to a form of psychological determinism (Gebharter 2020, sec. 3
makes a similar point).
As an intermediate result, Afia could have done otherwise in the sense identified by List
even if physical determinism is true. However, the case supports the idea that there is an
important everyday understanding of ‘can do otherwise’ which is such that Afia could not
have done otherwise in this sense, which is explained by the fact that her history at the
physical level was deterministic. Thus, the line of thinking presented so far supports a
moderate version of the linking thesis: if, given the complete physical state of the
world at any point in time, only one future sequence of events is physically possible,
then, in one everyday sense of ‘can do otherwise’, in any situation, agents cannot do
otherwise than they in fact do.
Let me discuss some objections against this line of reasoning.6 First, one could object
that the discussion of Afia’s case involves an unrealistic picture of what we know. Science
is extremely far away from what we imagine to know in the case of Afia. However, it is
important for List that his account of free will is scientifically acceptable.
As a first reply, the scenario of Afia does not seem to be much further away from what
science tells us than what List imagines in his line of reasoning. When arguing against the
linking thesis, he depicts a more complex system than we imagined above (see List 2019,
92–97). When looking at this system, we also know the possible psychological states of
the agent and the physical states that can be their realizers. The only difference
between List’s case and the one involving Afia is that, in the latter, we imagine that we
learn after t3 which psychological and physical state Afia in fact was in at t3. This
allows us to infer her history at the physical and psychological level, which is also possible
in List’s model, even if he does not explicitly say it. Thus, it is true that the reasoning pre-
sented here involves imagining that we have more knowledge than List’s line of reason-
ing requires us to imagine. However, I see no reason to think that the line between a
scientifically acceptable imagined scenario and a scientifically unacceptable imagined
scenario runs exactly between us.
As a second reply, assume that the line of reasoning that involves Afia’s case is much
further away from what science tells us than List’s. Would this be a problem? I do not see
that it would. Philosophy is full of thought experiments in which we imagine being in
unrealistic situations and in which we ask ourselves something like ‘would life in the
experience machine be best?’ (see Moore 2019) or ‘does Mary learn some new
Figure 4.
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information?’ (see Nida-Rümelin and O Conaill 2019). These lines of thinking are meant to
tell us something interesting about the good life and about what kind of information
there is. Arguing in this way does not use the empirical sciences, but I see no reason to
think that it is scientifically unacceptable. And the same holds when we ask ourselves if
Afia could have done otherwise in order to learn something about ‘can do otherwise’.
Therefore, I conclude that this objection on behalf of List is not convincing.
A second objection says that the discussion of Afia begs the question against List’s
view because it focuses too much on the physical level. List argues that the ability to
do otherwise is a psychological phenomenon that needs to be described at the psycho-
logical level. But the way I described Afia’s case above, the objection goes, focuses on the
physical states and infers physical-level trajectories. It is no surprise that we cannot find an
ability to act otherwise on this physical level, the objection says. But this does not speak
against List’s view that there is an ability to act otherwise at the psychological level.
As a response, recall the dialectical situation. The question at hand is whether deter-
minism at the physical level has implications for the psychological level. Thus, at this
point we cannot assume that the psychological is very independent from the physical.
Whether this is so is the question at issue. List gives an answer to this question by present-
ing a line of thinking illustrated by Figures 1 and 2. His conclusion is, roughly: the psycho-
logical is largely independent from the physical. The line of reasoning that involves Afia’s
case supports a different answer to the question, namely: the psychological is more
dependent on the physical than List claims. At this point, there is an exchange of argu-
ments, but no question-begging.
Now recall the structure of the argument that involves Afia’s case. It works by, first,
trying to trigger the intuition that, in one important sense, Afia cannot do otherwise,
which is a claim on the psychological level. The argument says, second, that the best
explanation for this is that Afia’s history is deterministic at the physical level. Again, I
do not see that this begs the question against List. Rather, this is an independent argu-
ment to the conclusion that physical determinism rules out one everyday sense of ‘can
do otherwise’.
The third objection will provide a bridge to the next section. The objection concedes
that Afia lacks the ability to do otherwise in some sense. But, the objection says, this sense
of ‘can do otherwise’ is not the one at issue in everyday thinking about agency. Let me
elaborate.
List modifies a case from Angelika Kratzer in which a Vienna Circle philosopher answers
a judge’s question of whether a murderer could have done otherwise. The philosopher
claims that, ‘given the whole microphysical history leading up to the crime’, including
‘all relevant neurophysiological processes leading up to the murderer’s action’, the mur-
derer could not have done otherwise than she did (List 2019, 106). The point of the case is
that the philosopher misunderstood the judge’s question. While the judge wanted to
know something like ‘Could the murderer have acted otherwise given our best psycho-
logical theories?’, the philosopher understood the judge as asking ‘Could she have
acted otherwise given our best physical theories?’ The objection says that our judgment
that Afia cannot do otherwise is like the Vienna Circle philosopher’s judgment about the
murderer: it relies on a misunderstanding of how we use ‘can’ in everyday life.
As a first reply, it seems plausible that the Vienna Circle philosopher misunderstood the
judge because the judge is a judge. This suggests that she is interested in an
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understanding of ‘can do otherwise’ that is legally relevant. Facts about the microphysical
history of an action, however, are not relevant in the legal systems I know. But I see no
reason to hold that everyday thinking about ‘can do otherwise’ is restricted to an under-
standing of ‘can do otherwise’ that is legally relevant. Therefore, it would be better to have
a non-legal example.
Imagine that Afia wins the Nobel Prize for physics. There was a moment in her career in
which she thought about becoming a lawyer or a physicist. The history that led to her
becoming a physicist looks like Figures 3 and 4. That is, the thick line went to her intention
to become a physicist and the thin line through the intention to become a lawyer. After
she won the Nobel Prize, someone asks us if Afia could have become a lawyer.
This question can be understood in different ways. Here are three options. First, the
person wants to know if Afia has the intellectual and psychological dispositions and
virtues that a lawyer needs – this is an understanding of ‘can do otherwise’ close to the
dispositionalist understanding sketched in section 2. In that case, we do not know the
answer. Second, the person wants to know whether Afia’s becoming a lawyer was consist-
ent with some of her earlier psychological states – this is, roughly, List’s understanding of
‘can do otherwise’. The answer would be ‘Yes’. Third, the person wants to know whether
Afia had access to a course of physical and psychological events that would have had the
result that she ended up being a lawyer – this is the interpretation presented in this
section. The answer would be ‘No’.
Is one of these interpretations more natural than the others? Personally, I find that
the first (dispositionalist) interpretation is the one that comes to mind most immedi-
ately in this case. But with regard to the second and third interpretation of ‘can do
otherwise’, I see no difference in terms of what is more natural in everyday thinking.
In particular, I see no reason to hold that the sense of ‘can do otherwise’ which
focuses on the physical and psychological accessibility of different actions is further
away from everyday thinking than a sense of ‘can do otherwise’ that focuses on con-
sistency with earlier psychological states. Thus, I see no reason to believe that the
judgment that Afia cannot do otherwise rests on a misunderstanding of the everyday
notion of ‘can’.
But there is still an open question. The discussion so far was meant to support the idea
that if physical determinism is true, agents lack the ability to do otherwise in one impor-
tant sense. But, as the case highlighted again, agents may still have the ability to do other-
wise in other important senses. Which of these senses is most relevant for free will? This
will be the guiding question of the next section.7
To sum up, one of List’s main goals is to offer an account of ‘can do otherwise’ that is
compatibilist and close to everyday thinking. I have argued for two claims in this section.
First, there is an important everyday sense of ‘can do otherwise’ that is incompatibilist;
and second, it is far from clear that the sense List picks out is the one which is most rel-
evant in our everyday thinking about agency.
4. Free will and responsibility
List’s second main goal identified above is to offer a compatibilist account of ‘can do
otherwise’ which is clearly relevant for free will. In order to find out if he achieves it, I
will first present List’s most important philosophical opponents, namely free will skeptics
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– or skeptics, for short. The skeptics’ position will, then, serve as a foil in order to test if
List’s account helps in meeting the skeptical challenge. I will argue that it does not.
A core motivation for thinking about free will is a concern about responsibility and,
especially, our practices of holding people responsible by blaming, praising, and being
grateful towards them. Many authors, including List, assume ‘the presence of free will
somewhere along the relevant chain of events to be a necessary condition for a salient
form of moral responsibility’ (List 2019, 28 italics in original; see also Mele 2006; Levy
2011; Vargas 2013; Pereboom 2014). Thus, agents can perform actions out of free will
without being responsible for them, perhaps because they lack a certain knowledge.
But if they are responsible for their actions, then they performed them out of free will.
A standard, broadly Strawsonian account of responsibility says that being responsible
should be understood in terms of being an appropriate target of certain responses. In
what follows, I will focus on responsibility for objectionable actions. The idea is that an
agent is responsible for an objectionable action just in case it is appropriate to blame
the person for it (see, e.g. Wallace 1994; Watson [1996] 2004; Darwall 2006; Schulte
2014; Pereboom 2014; Shoemaker 2015; Menges forthcoming).
The appropriateness at issue can be understood in different ways, but most skeptics
spell it out in moral terms, namely in terms of justice, fairness, or desert (see Strawson
1994; Levy 2011; Waller 2011; Caruso 2012; Pereboom 2014; for an overview, see
Caruso 2018). Note that there is an important difference between the claim that agents
are responsible for objectionable actions in the sense that it is fair, just, or deserved to
blame them for the actions and the claim that it is all-things-considered justified, permiss-
ible, or good to do so. It can be fair, deserved, or just to blame agents for some action
without its being fully justified to blame them (e.g. if blaming them has disastrous con-
sequences) and the other way around (e.g. if blaming them has fantastic consequences).
Moreover, claiming that agents are responsible for bad actions in the sense that blaming
them would be fair, just, or deserved does not necessarily commit one to the retributive
idea that harming them would be noninstrumentally good. Alternatively, claims about
fair, deserved, or just blame can be understood as implying that there is a conditional
reason to blame the agents (see Nelkin 2016, sec. 2), that the agents’ interests in not
being blamed can be discounted in consequentialist calculations (see Levy 2011, 3), or
that the blamed agent owes the victim an apology (see Pettit 2007, sec. 1).8
On this rough picture, free will is an important necessary condition for a person’s being
responsible for an objectionable action in the sense that blaming the person for it would
be just, fair, or deserved, while this kind of appropriateness does not imply that blaming is
all-things-considered good or justified.9 Free will skeptics contend that there is very good
reason to doubt that humans have free will in this sense. Then, the challenge from deter-
minism is whether it can be, in the relevant sense, appropriate to blame humans in a
deterministic world. If it cannot, we have strong moral reason to reform our blame prac-
tices if we find out that physical determinism is true.
Some authors reply that they are not concerned with this kind of free will (see, e.g. Ber-
ofsky 2012, chap. 1). List, however, seems to accept such a picture of free will and respon-
sibility (see List and Pettit 2011, sec. 7.1; List 2019, 154; List’s contribution to Caruso, List,
and Clark 2020).10 Moreover, even if some defenders of free will are not interested in the
relation between free will and the moral appropriateness of the responsibility practices,
they should be interested in it if they want to engage with their strongest philosophical
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opponents, namely the free will skeptics I sketched above. Otherwise, they would simply
talk past the skeptics.
The picture of responsibility I have just presented suggests a way to test whether the
kind of alternative possibilities List picks out and shows to be compatible with physical
determinism is relevant for free will discourse. His account of ‘can do otherwise’ should
help to explain when it is and when it is not appropriate to blame agents. The best
way to test this is to imagine two agents who act morally objectionably, fulfill all epistemic
and other agency conditions that are necessary for being responsible, and only differ in
one relevant respect: one of them can do otherwise in List’s sense and the other
cannot. If List’s account is relevant for free will skepticism, then the first is an appropriate
target of blame, while the second is not.
Imagine that Charlie is a great physicist, but not as great as Afia. He fulfills all the rel-
evant epistemic conditions for moral responsibility, his agency is fully intact, and so on. At
t1 Charlie is in the psychological state of desiring to win the Nobel Prize before Afia does.
This desire is realizable by two different physical states and consistent with two different
histories at the psychological level from t1 to t3 (see Figures 5 and 6). One of the psycho-
logical histories involves the beliefs that Afia will probably win the next Nobel Prize and
that the only way to prevent this is to kill her at t3, his doubts about whether this is a good
idea, and then finally the intention to kill Afia. The other history ends with the intention to
not kill Afia. Thus, according to List’s interpretation, Charlie can, at t1, choose between
killing Afia at t3 and not killing Afia at t3. As we assume that he fulfills all other conditions
for responsibility, List’s account implies that Charlie would be responsible for what he
intends to do at t3. Then, Charlie kills Afia at t3, such that he is, on List’s account, an appro-
priate target of blame for it.
Now consider Dadi in a world very close to the world in which Charlie kills Afia and who
differs from Charlie in only one relevant way. Namely, without any fault of his own, Dadi’s
psychological states between t1 and t3 are not multiply realizable. That is, each of his
psychological states can only be realized by one physical state (see Figure 7). We could
imagine that, in Dadi’s world, mental states in general are not multiply realizable (reduc-
tionists claim that our world is like that; for an overview see Bickle 2016). Or we can
imagine that a very special constellation of events for which Dadi is not responsible
made it the case that, between t1 and t3, Dadi’s psychological states are not multiply rea-
lizable. Then, the sequence of physical and psychological events is identical with the
sequence described above with regard to Charlie. Dadi believes that Afia will probably
win the next Nobel Prize, that the only way to prevent this is to kill her at t3, he
doubts whether this is a good idea, and then he forms the intention to kill Afia and actu-
ally does it (see Figure 8).
Figure 5.
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In contrast to Charlie, Dadi’s psychological states are not multiply realizable and, there-
fore, not consistent with physical and psychological states other than the ones he is in fact
in. Thus, in List’s sense, Charlie can, but Dadi cannot do otherwise.
If List’s account of ‘can do otherwise’ is relevant for the free will debate as I described it
above, then the absence of other physical and psychological states that are consistent
with Dadi’s desire to win the Nobel Prize before Afia explains why he is, in contrast to
Charlie, not responsible for killing Afia. Then, it would be morally appropriate to blame
Charlie for killing Afia, but it would be inappropriate to blame Dadi even though he com-
mitted the same deed.
I find this implausible. If one assumes that it is morally appropriate to blame Charlie,
why should one think that it is inappropriate to blame Dadi?
Note, first, how similar they are. Their actual psychological histories were almost iden-
tical: they had the same quality of will, first- and second-order desires, the very same line
of thinking led to their killing Afia, and so on.11 Thus, those who think that some of these
factors (together with the other relevant agency and epistemic properties we assume
them to have) are sufficient for responsibility will take Charlie and Dadi to be equally
(in)appropriate targets of blame.
The strongest objection against the claim that Charlie and Dadi differ with respect to
morally appropriate blame is the following: a general and very plausible principle says
that if it is morally appropriate (fair, just, or deserved) to blame one agent but not
another, then there must be a morally relevant difference between them. Applied to
our case, this principle demands that, if it is morally appropriate to blame Charlie and
inappropriate to blame Dadi, then there must be a morally relevant difference between
them. List’s view suggests two options to account for this difference. The first is to say
that the fact that Charlie’s mental states are multiply realizable while Dadi’s mental
states are not is morally relevant. The second option says that the fact that Charlie’s
psychological state at t1 is consistent with different future courses of actions, while
Dadi’s psychological state at t1 is not, is morally relevant. However, both claims are
quite implausible. They are neither intuitively convincing nor do I see arguments for




no morally relevant difference between Charlie and Dadi, such that there is no difference
between them with regard to fair, just, or deserved blame.13
Recall how we got here. In the preceding section, I argued that, if determinism is true,
then an agent who can do otherwise in List’s sense cannot do otherwise in another impor-
tant sense. The question in this section is whether List picks out a sense of ‘can do other-
wise’ that is relevant for philosophical debates about free will. If List’s notion of ‘can do
otherwise’ is supposed to be the same that is at issue in the debate about philosophical
free will skepticism, then his account should help to explain when it is and when it is not
appropriate to blame agents. However, the cases above suggest that it does not help with
this issue. Two agents who only differ in the respect that one of them can while the other
can’t do otherwise in List’s sense do not differ with regard to morally appropriate blame. If
this is correct, then List picks out a sense of alternative possibilities that does not capture
what is important to List’s strongest philosophical opponents, namely free will skeptics.
These skeptics would say about List’s account what he says about dispositionalism,
namely that it delivers ‘only a watered-down notion of alternative possibilities: a notion
that does not capture what we normally mean by saying that someone ‘could have
done otherwise’’ (List 2019, 85).
5. Starting from the moral level of description
List’s diagnosis of the skeptical challenges to free will in general and the deterministic
challenge in particular is that they rely on the illegitimate blending of the physical and
the psychological level (see List 2019, 150). Those who look for free will at the physical
level will not find it because it is a psychological, not a physical phenomenon. Once we
look at the psychological level, List says, we will find it. I have argued above that this is
too quick. Adopting this approach may arguably identify some kind of freedom which
is compatible with determinism. But it looks as if this kind of freedom is not the one skep-
tics are skeptical about and we have reason to worry about. In this final section, I will
propose how proponents of the level-based approach can make sure that they identify
the relevant kind of freedom. The idea is, roughly, that one should start thinking about
free will at the moral level and then look for it at the psychological level (the approach
is inspired by Wallace 1994; see also Schulte 2014). I will first sketch a rough understand-
ing of the moral level of description. Then, I will present how thinking on the moral level
helps to clarify what free will is, if it exists at all. Finally, I will compare this approach to
List’s.
While List mostly focuses on different levels of the empirical realm, it seems fruitful to
apply the idea of levels to the non-empirical realm, too. One could argue that there is a
fundamental normative level that, depending on one’s metaethical commitments,
Figure 8.
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operates with notions such as values, reasons, or obligations (List 2018, sec. 4.4 describes
the normative in terms of ‘may’ and ‘ought’). Higher normative levels would be, for
example, epistemology, ethics/morality, or political theory. These different levels
operate with their own normative notions such as knowledge and evidence in epistem-
ology, permissibility and desert in ethics or just distribution and freedom in political
theory. While it seems plausible that, for example, epistemological and moral facts super-
vene on deeper normative facts about reasons, values, or obligations, moral facts do not
supervene on epistemological facts and vice versa (see List 2018, sec. 4.1 for a similar dis-
cussion of geology and biology). As the question of how the normative levels relate to the
physical level touches on some of the most complicated metaethical issues, I will have to
leave it aside (but see List 2018, sec. 4.4).
My main proposal is that adopting the moral perspective will tell us what free will is, if it
exists at all, by identifying the roles that it is expected to play. Therefore, thinking about
free will should start at this level. Here is a sketch of how to do this.
Consider the skeptics again who argue that humans do not have the kind of control
that is necessary for its being morally appropriate to blame them. The question of
what this kind of control is needs to be discussed at the moral level by using notions
like fairness, desert, wronging, claims, and so on. The question has the structure ‘What
is the X-condition which is necessary for its being morally appropriate to y?’ Other ques-
tions with this structure are, for example, ‘What kind of threat is necessary for its being
legitimate to kill someone in self-defense?’ or ‘What must experimental subjects under-
stand about a study for its being permissible to use their data?’ These are first-order
moral questions.
Identifying the control which is necessary for its being morally appropriate to blame a
person involves getting clear about the nature of the relevant kind of blame. Do we want
to know when it is morally appropriate to punish people, to aggressively confront them,
to have anger emotions towards them, or something different (for some recent proposals,
see Carlsson 2017; Menges 2017; 2020; Caruso and Morris 2017; McKenna 2019)? This
question is important because different responses may require different kinds of
control. For example, it seems plausible that we need more control for its being
morally appropriate to physically punish us than for its being appropriate to feel resent-
ment towards us.
Once we have made clear what kind of response we are interested in, we need a better
understanding of the relevant kind of appropriateness. As I have indicated in the preced-
ing section, ‘appropriateness’ can be spelled out in terms of, for example, noninstrumen-
tal goodness of harm, conditional reasons to blame, or forfeiting claims against blame
(see, e.g. Levy 2011; Nelkin 2016; McKenna 2019). Identifying the relevant kind of appro-
priateness is relevant for free will because different kinds of appropriateness may require
different kinds of control. One may argue, for example, that the kind of appropriateness
which involves the non-instrumental goodness of harm requires a stronger kind of control
than many other kinds of moral appropriateness.
When we have identified the kind of response and the kind of appropriateness we are
interested in, we should ask what kind of control is necessary for its being in this sense
appropriate to respond in this way to an agent’s conduct. Must the agent be the
agent-cause of the relevant action, is it enough that the agent is reason-responsive to
a certain degree when she acts, that alternative actions are consistent with the agent’s
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earlier psychological states, must the action express the agent’s deep self, or is some other
kind of control necessary? Once we have answered this question, we will have identified
the kind of free will the skeptic is skeptical about. All this takes place on the moral level.
Now comes the second step in the attempt to deal with the skeptical challenges: one
needs to show that at least some humans have this kind of free will. This is a psychological
endeavor. Armchair philosophy may succeed in making it more or less plausible that
humans have a certain agential property. Folk psychological reasoning will also suggest
whether or not this is so. But if we want to be certain, we will need our best scientific
methods to prove it. To illustrate, assume the following rough picture (see, e.g. Arpaly
and Schroeder 2014, chap. 7; Shoemaker 2015, pt. 1; Sripada 2016): first, the relevant
kind of control over an action consists in the action’s being expressive of the agent’s
deep self; second, the deep self consists in a sub-class of the agent’s conative states
and/or value judgments; third, the expression relation is a specific causal relation. Now,
whether some humans have the relevant conative states and/or make the relevant
value judgments and whether a certain action expresses these states and/or judgments
are empirical questions that must be answered at the psychological level.
Let me compare this approach with List’s. It agrees with List that the psychological, or,
more generally, ‘the special science perspective is the only perspective from which we are
likely to be able to defend free will’ (List 2014, 173). Moreover, the picture agrees that
claims at the physical level about fundamental laws of nature are only relevant insofar
as they are connected to the psychological level. However, from the perspective of the
approach sketched here, List’s account puts the cart before the horse. It does not start
with a description of the roles that free will is expected to play at the moral level, but
with a description of alternative action possibilities at the psychological level. Unsurpris-
ingly, this approach fails to identify the kind of freedom skeptics worry about.
To be clear, the approach sketched here does not claim that reasoning at the moral
level will tell us if we have free will. However, to put the proposal in a nutshell, moral
reasoning should identify what we are looking for and psychological reasoning should
look for it.
To sum up, differentiating between a physical and a psychological level of description
helps to make clear if and how determinism and other claims about the fundamental
structure of the world can be relevant for free will. However, I have argued that merely
focusing on the psychological level runs the risk of not identifying the kind of free will
we have most reason to worry about. Therefore, such an account should be guided by
reasoning at the moral level. A detailed description of the roles that free will is expected
to play at the moral level will make sure that what we are looking for at the psychological
level will be relevant for the deepest worries about free will and an important part of our
everyday thinking. Whether we have this kind of free will is still an open question.
Notes
1. Note, e.g. that this view is not discussed in the SEP articles on free will (O’Connor and Franklin
2018) and compatibilism (McKenna and Coates 2015).
2. List (2019, chap. 3; see also 2018, sec. 4.2) argues in some detail that phenomena at the
psychological level such as beliefs, desires, or intentions cannot be fully explained in terms
of or reduced to phenomena at lower levels such as the neurological or physical level.
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3. See Elzein and Pernu (2017) and Gebharter (2020) for other critical discussions of List’s
account.
4. For details, see the account in (List and Menzies 2017; List 2019, chap. 5). The basic idea is that
we should understand causation in terms of difference making, and that, thus understood, an
agent’s mental states often are the causes of the agent’s actions, while the underlying phys-
ical states are not.
5. Note that we can imagine that we know all this without assuming that Afia’s desires, beliefs,
and other psychological states are reducible to the physical states she is in. The case of Afia is
compatible with List’s (2019, 64–69) thesis that these psychological states have the feature of
intentionality that physical states do not.
6. I am very grateful to an anonymous referee for the following objections and thoughtful com-
ments on my replies.
7. There is another question that, due to limited space, I cannot discuss in more detail. List offers
an intriguing argument for the claim that humans have the ability to do otherwise and one
may wonder how Afia’s case relates to this argument. The very rough idea of the argument is
that our best psychological theories imply that humans can do otherwise and, generally, if
our best theories of a certain domain imply that something exists, then there is very good
reason to think that it exists (List 2019, 74–77, 97–103). This line of reasoning does not
come in conflict with what I have argued for in this section. My thesis is that if physical deter-
minism is true, then humans lack the ability to do otherwise in one important sense of ‘can do
otherwise’. But I see no reason to think that our best psychological theories imply that
humans can do otherwise in this specific sense. Perhaps these theories imply that different
courses of action are consistent with some of the agents’ earlier psychological states (as
List says). Then, the argument would be consistent with my main thesis. See also note 10
below.
8. List (in Caruso, List, and Clark 2020) rejects a retributive justification of punishment. But it
should have become clear that the claim that agents are responsible in the sense that
they deserve blame does not imply that punishing them would be justified.
9. Note that this picture does not commit one to saying that the notion of free will is a moral or
normative one (which is an idea that List rejects; see his contribution to Caruso, List, and Clark
2020). The view says that we can characterize free will by saying that it is a kind of control that
an agent must have over an action for its being appropriate to blame the agent for it. Now
assume that being an agent-cause is the strongest kind of control that is necessary for being
an appropriate target of blame. Then we can analyze having free will in terms of being an
agent-cause, which is, plausibly, a non-normative analysis.
10. Even though List accepts the picture of responsibility and free will I have sketched here, he
does not seem to take the relation between free will and responsibility to be crucial for his
theorizing about ‘can do otherwise’. As I said in note 7, he aims at showing that our best
psychological theories imply that humans can do otherwise in a certain sense. And he
takes this sense to be relevant for free will. But skeptics do not need to accept this last
assumption. They are skeptical about the kind of agency that is necessary for fair, just, or
deserved blame. In order to show that the kind of freedom that List defends is relevant for
the skeptical worries, List would need to show that the sense of ‘can do otherwise’ that is sup-
ported by psychological theories is relevant for fair, just, or deserved blame. So far, I see no
reason why it should be.
11. Strictly speaking, Charlie’s and Dadi’s mental states are not the same because Charlie’s mental
states are multiply realizable, while Dadi’s aren’t. Thus, the precise but unnecessarily compli-
cated formulation would say that they have exactly the same quality of will, desires, and so
on, apart from the fact that they differ with regard to the multiple realizability of their mental
states.
12. One may reply on behalf of List, that the fact that Charlie’s psychological state at t1 is con-
sistent with different future courses of action, while Dadi’s psychological state at t1 is not,
is important. It shows that Charlie, the reply goes, has a certain kind of choice, while Dadi
does not. And having this kind of choice can (partly) explain why it is appropriate to
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blame the chooser (thanks to an anonymous referee for pressing me on this). By contrast, the
line of reasoning presented in the main text is meant to trigger the intuition that having this
kind of choice is not morally relevant (in this sense). And it seems to me that the burden of
proof lies on the side of List here. His position is committed to the claim that having a choice
in the sense that different courses of action are consistent with one’s psychological state has
the normative weight that can explain deserved, fair, or just blame. But why should this be
so? Why should the mere consistency of future actions be morally relevant? As I said, I do
not see an intuitive answer nor do I see arguments for why this consistency is morally rel-
evant. Therefore, I suggest that the burden of proof lies on the side of List.
13. The case of Dadi highlights an interesting implication of List’s view. While most skeptics about
free will think that determinism and luck undermine free will, List’s account suggests that one
of the most serious threats to free will is the possible falsehood of the claim that mental states
are multiply realizable. That is, if it turns out that psychological states are not multiply realiz-
able, then every human is like Dadi, no human has alternative possibilities, and, therefore, free
will in List’s sense would be an illusion. I find this noteworthy. In one place, List suggests that
we should respond to the ‘discovery’ that physical determinism is true by seeing it as ‘“just”
an interesting development in science’ (List 2019, 158). Personally, I would find it much easier
to see the discovery that mental states are not multiply realizable as just an interesting devel-
opment in science.
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